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Credit: DisneyWhen Disney overhauled its Disability Access Service in 2024, the changes sent shockwaves through the disability community. What was once a relatively accessible system that allowed guests with disabilities to experience Disney parks without waiting in standard queues became significantly more restrictive, with eligibility requirements tightening to the point where many guests who previously qualified found themselves denied access.
The modifications sparked immediate controversy, with disabled guests sharing stories of being turned away, told to practice waiting in line at home, or given suggestions that seemed to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of their disabilities.
Now a disabled Disney shareholder is attempting to force the company to reckon with the impacts of those changes through a shareholder resolution calling for an independent review of Disney’s accessibility and disability inclusion practices.
Erik Paul’s resolution asks Disney to commission a qualified third party to assess the legal, financial, and reputational risks associated with the DAS overhaul, evaluate Disney’s policies against international accessibility standards and competitor practices, and identify opportunities for improvement.
The resolution further requests that Disney’s Board provide both a public summary and internal briefing on the findings to ensure accountability and transparency.
The timing of Paul’s resolution intersects with a significant shift in how the Securities and Exchange Commission handles shareholder proposals. On November 17, just two weeks after Disney filed a letter asking the SEC to allow exclusion of Paul’s resolution, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance announced it would no longer review company attempts to exclude shareholder proposals except in limited state-law circumstances.
The change took effect immediately, meaning Disney no longer needs SEC approval to block the resolution from appearing on proxy materials that shareholders vote on during annual meetings.
Disney’s November 4 letter to the SEC argued the resolution should be excluded because it is “materially false and misleading,” relates to “ordinary business operations,” and claims Disney has “substantially implemented” what the proposal requests.
Paul has submitted a rebuttal responding to Disney’s claims, but the SEC rule change fundamentally alters the playing field by removing the regulatory body that previously mediated these disputes between shareholders and corporations.
The situation creates a David versus Goliath scenario where a disabled shareholder attempting to hold Disney accountable for accessibility changes faces not only the company’s resistance but also a regulatory environment that suddenly shifted in Disney’s favor.
Paul’s statement captures the bitter irony: “Disney has long told stories where the powerless rise, villains fall, and wrongs are made right. Its brand is built on magic, inclusion, and the belief that every voice deserves to be heard. Yet now, in a twist worthy of its darkest tales, the company risks becoming the villain of its own story, using newfound power to silence the very shareholders it should be listening to.”
What the Shareholder Resolution Actually Requests
Paul’s resolution doesn’t ask Disney to reverse the DAS changes or restore the previous system. Instead, it requests something that should be relatively uncontroversial: an independent assessment of what happened and what risks the company now faces.
The specific language asks Disney to “commission an independent review, conducted by a qualified third party, of the company’s accessibility and disability inclusion practices.” This review would assess legal, financial, and reputational risks, evaluate Disney’s policies against international accessibility standards and competitors, and identify opportunities for leadership improvement.
The resolution also requests that Disney’s Board provide both a public summary and internal briefing on findings to ensure accountability and transparency.
This is a measured request. It doesn’t demand specific policy changes. It doesn’t threaten litigation. It simply asks Disney to allow an independent expert to examine the DAS overhaul and report findings to both shareholders and Disney’s leadership.
The fact that Disney is fighting to exclude even this modest proposal suggests the company either believes it has nothing to gain from such a review or fears what an independent assessment might reveal.
Disney’s Arguments for Exclusion
Disney’s November 4 letter to the SEC provided three main arguments for why Paul’s resolution should be excluded from shareholder voting.
First, Disney claims the resolution is “materially false and misleading.” This argument typically applies when shareholder proposals contain factually incorrect statements that could mislead other shareholders about what they’re voting on. Disney apparently believes statements in Paul’s resolution misrepresent the situation in ways that would confuse shareholders.
Second, Disney argues the resolution “relates to the Company’s ordinary business operations.” This is a common exclusion ground that allows companies to block shareholder proposals dealing with day-to-day operational decisions rather than major policy issues. Disney’s position is that DAS policies fall under ordinary business operations that management should control without shareholder interference.
Third, Disney claims it has “substantially implemented the Proposal,” meaning the company argues it’s already doing what the resolution requests. This exclusion ground allows companies to block proposals that have become moot because the company already addressed the underlying concerns.
Paul has submitted a rebuttal challenging these arguments, but the SEC rule change means the SEC won’t evaluate whether Disney’s exclusion justifications have merit. Disney can simply exclude the resolution based on its own determination that these grounds apply.
The SEC Rule Change That Shifted Everything
The November 17 announcement from the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance fundamentally changed shareholder proposal dynamics. Previously, when companies wanted to exclude shareholder proposals from proxy materials, they had to request SEC approval by explaining why exclusion grounds applied.
The SEC staff would review both the company’s arguments and any shareholder rebuttals before issuing a decision about whether exclusion was appropriate.
This process provided shareholders meaningful protection. Even if companies disagreed with proposals, an independent regulatory body evaluated whether exclusion justifications were legitimate. Shareholders knew their proposals would receive fair consideration based on established legal standards rather than corporate preference.
The new rule eliminates that oversight except in narrow state-law circumstances. Companies can now exclude shareholder proposals based on their own interpretation of whether exclusion grounds apply, with no SEC review to check whether those interpretations are reasonable. The change dramatically tilts power toward corporations and away from shareholders attempting to raise concerns through the proposal process.
For Paul’s resolution specifically, the timing couldn’t be worse. Disney filed its exclusion request on November 4. The SEC rule change took effect November 17. If the change had occurred a month later, the SEC would have reviewed Disney’s arguments and Paul’s rebuttal to determine whether exclusion was justified. Instead, Disney can exclude the resolution without any external check on whether its reasoning holds up.
The 2024 DAS Overhaul That Started This
Disney updated DAS requirements at both Walt Disney World and Disneyland Resort, significantly limiting eligibility. The company tightened criteria for who qualifies for the service, leaving many guests who previously received DAS unable to access it under the new rules.
Disney has suggested alternatives like practicing waiting in line at home or requesting return times at attractions, though many attraction cast members haven’t been trained to offer return times, creating confusion and inconsistent experiences.
Disney has continued tweaking DAS elements and guidelines since the initial overhaul, including adding information about the required video call guests must complete to request DAS and extending the service’s validity period. These ongoing adjustments suggest Disney recognizes problems with the implementation even as the company fights to avoid independent review of the changes.
The modifications affect real people with real disabilities who planned Disney vacations expecting accommodation they’d previously received. Guests have shared experiences of being denied DAS despite qualifying under previous criteria, receiving conflicting information from different cast members, or being told to use alternatives that don’t actually work for their specific disabilities.
The human impact of these policy changes is what drives Paul’s resolution requesting independent review.
What This Means for Disney and Disabled Guests
The intersection of Paul’s shareholder resolution, Disney’s resistance, and the SEC rule change creates several concerning implications for how corporations handle disability access issues.
First, it demonstrates that even shareholders, who theoretically have power to influence corporate governance, face significant barriers when challenging company policies. If a disabled shareholder can’t get a resolution calling for independent review onto a proxy ballot, what recourse do regular disabled guests have?
Second, Disney’s arguments for excluding the resolution reveal the company’s posture toward accountability on DAS changes. Rather than welcoming independent assessment that could validate the changes if they’re sound or identify improvements if they’re not, Disney is using every available mechanism to prevent such review from happening.
Third, the SEC rule change shows how regulatory environments can shift suddenly in ways that affect individual cases. Paul’s resolution was filed under rules that provided SEC oversight. By the time Disney responded, those rules had changed in ways that eliminated meaningful shareholder protection.
For disabled guests planning Disney vacations, the situation offers little comfort. The shareholder resolution likely won’t proceed to a vote. The ongoing lawsuit will take years to resolve. In the meantime, the 2024 DAS changes remain in effect, with Disney continuing to make incremental adjustments without the independent review Paul requested.
Paul’s statement that Disney risks “becoming the villain of its own story” by “silencing the disabled community” resonates beyond mere rhetoric. Disney built its brand on inclusion and the belief that every voice deserves to be heard.
When the company uses corporate and regulatory mechanisms to block even modest requests for independent review of disability policies, it undermines those brand values in ways that may ultimately prove more costly than any assessment would have been.